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The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: Of Privileges and the
Divison of Rule-Making Power
INTRODUCTION

In 1961, a Special Committee on Evidence, appointed by Chief
Justice Earl Warren, returned a report recommending the adoption
of uniform rules of evidence for the federal courts. 1 Consequently,
on March 8, 1965, the Supreme Court appointed an Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence. In March of 1969 the first draft of the
rules was finished and circulated to the bar and bench,2 whose criticism and comments resulted in revised drafts in March 1971;3 October 1971;4 and November 1972.5 The November draft was approved
by the Court and sent to Congress as the Court's Proposed Rules. 6
Under the Rules Enabling Act,7 these rules would have taken
effect automatically had Congress not acted within ninety days.
However, in early 1973, Congress, responding to the controversy and
criticism triggered by the Proposed Rules, acted to prevent the Rules
from becoming effective. 8 Both houses of Congress then drafted
their own rules which, while based on the Proposed Rules, revised
I. Special Committee on Evidence of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Preliminary Study of the Advisability and Feasibility of .Developing Un!form Rules of Evidence for the
Federal Courts, 30 F.R.D. 79, ll4-17 (1961).
2. Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161
(1969).
3. Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315 (1971).
4. See P. ROTHSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING THE NEW FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 2, 8. n.4
(Supp. 1975).
5. Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183 (1972).
6. Id. at 184.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976). It provides:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general rules, the forms of
process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure of the district
courts and courts of appeals of the United States in civil actions, including admiralty and
maritime cases, and appeals therein, and the practice and procedure in proceedings for the
review by the courts of appeals of decisions of the Tax Court of the United States and for
the judicial review or enforcement of orders of administrative agencies, boards, commissions, and officers.
Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right and shall preserve the right of trial by jury as at common law and as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution.
Such rules shall not take effect until they have been reported to Congress by the Chief
Justice at or after the beginning of a regular session thereof but not later than the first day
of May, and until the expiration of ninety days after they have been thus reported.
All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules
have taken effect. Nothing in this title, anything therein to the contrary notwithstanding,
shall in any way limit, supersede, or repeal any such rules heretofore prescribed by the
Supreme Court.
8. Act of March 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9.
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them in several major respects. A compromise reached by the two
houses produced the present Federal Rules of Evidence for United
States Courts and Magistrates, which were enacted on January 2,
1975.9

Article V, the section on privileges, provoked the greatest dissension and underwent the greatest change. 10 Three kinds of issues
were involved. First, the Proposed Rules were to apply to diversityof-citizenship as well as federal-question cases. But many Congressmen, heeding the federalism concerns articulated in Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins, 11 feared that this choice-of-law decision was unconstitutional.12 Second, a dispute between those supporting and those opposing codification of the common-law evidence rules was most
intense in the privilege area. 13 Finally, each privilege which was included or excluded was important to one or more special interest
groups, and these groups lobbied vigorously.
The Proposed Rules on privileges contained thirteen rules 14
which codified nine specific privileges 15 and a general provision that
only those enumerated privileges were to be recognized in the federal courts. 16 However, to avoid a stalemate on the entire set of
rules, Congress replaced these thirteen rules with one general rule,
Federal Rule of Evidence 501, which provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States
or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted
by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.
However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element
of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political
subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law. 17
9. Federal Rules of Evidence, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
10. As Representative Hungate remarked, "Without doubt, the privilege section of the
rules of evidence generated more comment or controversy than any other section. I would say
that 50 percent of the complaints received by the Criminal Justice Subcommittee related to the
privilege section." 120 CoNG. REC. 40891 (1974).
I 1. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
12. See text at notes 101-04 iefra.
13. See text at notes 117-25 iefra.
14. Proposed Rules 501-513, 56 F.R.D. 183, 230-60 (1972).
15. See Proposed Rules 502 (state-required reports), 503 (attorney-client relationship), 504
(psychotherapist-patient relationship), 505 (spouses), 506 (clergyman-parishioner relationship),
507 (voters), 508 (trade secrets), 509 (state secrets), & 510 (identity of informer), 56 F.R.D. at
234-55.
16. Proposed Rule 501, 56 F.R.D. at 230. This rule applied not only to federal-question
cases but also to diversity-of-citizenship cases where state substantive law would apply. See
Advisory Committee Note to Proposed Rule 501, 56 F.R.D. at 232.
17. FED. R. Evm. 501.
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Congress, that is, returned the privilege problem to the courts
with little guidance. In addition, Congress limited the Supreme
Court's authority to make rules in the privilege area so that any
amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence "creating, abolishing,
or modifying a privilege shall have no force or effect unless it shall
be approved by act of Congress." 18
Historically, making rules of procedure for the federal courts has
been a joint enterprise of the Supreme Court and Congress. 19 Congress's rejection of the Proposed Rules and its unprecedented action
fn the privilege area presents the courts with a dilemma unique in
the jurisprudential history of the United States.20 What authority, if
any, should the courts give the Proposed Rules in deciding privilege
issues? The Supreme Court has not yet resolved this dilemma, and
divergent answers by the lower federal co~rts21 have produced a lack
of uniformity that threatens the effectiveness of the privileges which
the federal courts had recognized before the Proposed Rules. Furthermore, the commentators have been singularly unhelpful to the
courts, since they have failed to provide the courts with an analysis
of the sources of the rule-making power. Even Judge Weinstein,
whose otherwise admirable book might usefully have discussed the
problem, contents himself with assumptions rather than analysis
when he treats this issue. 22
This Note proposes that the lower federal courts accord the same
binding authority to the Proposed Rules that they give those judicially promulgated procedural rules, such as the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, that have been implicitly approved by Congress.23
Part I of the Note analyzes the constitutional division of the rulemaking power by examining both the policy considerations involved
and the relevant constitutional language and doctrines. That examination indicates that the power to establish such rules is shared by
Congress and the Supreme Court. To determine when that power is
appropriately exercised by one branch rather than the other, the
18. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, § 2(a){l), 88 Stat. 1948 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2076 (1976)).
19. See text at notes 58-79 in.fro.

20. It is true that rule SOi's directive to interpret common-law principles "in the light of
reason and experience," see text at note 17 supra, also appears in rule 26 of the original
version of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 327 U.S. 821, 852 (1946). However, the
language of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was promulgated by the Court, not legislatively imposed. Thus, that situation differs in that the courts had not relied on different rules
prior to a legislative reversal, nor had there been a legislative reversal of judicial action.
21. See text at notes 133-45 in.fro.
22. J. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES 89-90 (1977). {A
shorter version of this work is Weinstein, Reform ofFederal Court Rule-Making Procedures, 76
COLUM. L. REV. 905 (1976).) For a detailed discussion of Judge Weinstein's analysis, see note
42 in.fro.
23. See note 133 in.fro and accompanying text.
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Note turns to an analogous area of shared power, the power to define
the jurisdiction of the federal courts. This analogy suggests that a
"primarily adjudicative" test should be consulted to allocate rulemaking power between the two branches. Part I concludes by demonstrating that this test best explains the history of federal judicial
rule-making.
Part II explores the development of the federal law of evidence.
The early stages of that development suggest the propriety of using
the "primarily adjudicative" test for the specific area of evidence
rules. That test is then applied through an analysis of the intent behind the congressional treatment of the Proposed Rules, and it is
concluded that the Proposed Rules are binding on the lower courts.
Part III surveys the present confused state of federal rules of privilege and argues that they must be uniform if they are to be effective.
Only by heeding the "primarily adjudicative" test and treating the
Proposed Rules as binding authority can the present disuniformity
be ended and the rules be rescued from uselessness.

l.

THE PRIMARILY ADJUDICATIVE TEST FOR ALLOCATING THE
POWER To MAKE RULES BETWEEN THE COURTS AND
CONGRESS

Because the Constitution does not explicitly refer to the power to
establish procedural rules for the courts, the inquiry regarding its
allocation must turn to such considerations as the function of such
rules and to inferences from the Constitution and from the historical
practice of Congress and the Court. At the heart of the inquiry is a
separation-of-powers problem. This Note argues that the authority
to make rules is shared and that the test for its allocation in a given
situation is the following "primarily adjudicative" test: If the primary function of a rule is to facilitate adjudication, then the power
to make that rule is judicial; if its primary function is non-adjudicative, then the power is legislative.
A. Policy Considerations

Both the judicial and legislative branches have a significant interest in writing rules of procedure for the courts.24 The courts have an
interest because rules of procedure affect how courts work as well as
the results they reach. 25 Thus, early in this century, Dean Wigmore
and Dean Pound argued that the rule-making power should be exclusively judicial.26 Central to that argument was the courts'
24. For a discussion of these interests in the context of the privilege rules, see text at notes
87-91 i'!fra.
25. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468-69 (1964).
26. Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for Judiciary Procedure Are Void Constitutionally, 23
ILL. L. REV. 276 (1928); Pound, The Rule-Making Power ofthe Courts, 12 A.B.A.J. 599 (1926) •.
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firsthand knowledge of their own needs and problems.27 Yet Congress has an interest in preventing the substantive effects of rules of
procedure from conflicting with the aims of legislation. 28 Furthermore, rules of procedure are often designed to serve social policy
goals external to the working of the court system. 29 Such goals are
outside the firsthand knowledge of the judiciary. Not only does
meeting these goals involve policy decisions more appropriately left
to the legislature, but Congress, with its extensive staff and its investigative powers,30 is better equipped to make such decisions. In
short, the policy considerations suggest that both branches need to
share the rule-making power.

B.

Constitutional Considerations: The Rule Against Advisory
Opinions

Although the Constitution does not mention the power to promulgate rules of procedure for the courts, two of its sections have
been interpreted as containing implicit but conflicting references to
that power. Article I, section 8, clause 9, grants Congress the power
"to constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court." Because
this clause has been read as giving Congress substantial power over
the procedures of the lower federal courts,31 it could arguably be
taken to give the power to establish rules of judicial procedure.
However, article III, section 1, states, "The judicial Power of the
United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish." If establishing rules of judicial procedure is inherent in
'judicial power," this section vests rule-making power in the judiciary.32 Thus, a textual analysis of the Constitution is not inconsistent
with the conclusion reached above that the rule-making power must
be shared between the branches.
Both advocated exclusively judicial control over rule-making, but as Dean Pound conceded,
"It may be that today, after seventy-five years of codes and practice acts and prolific procedural legislation, we can't go so far as to pronounce such legislative interference with the operations of a coordinate department to be unconstitutional." Id at 601.
27. See Pound, supra note 26, at 602; Wigmore, supra note 26, at 278.
28. An extreme example is that a rule precluding the admission into evidence of events
occurring more than six months prior to trial would alter the intended effect of a longer statute
of limitations.
29. See text at notes 87-91 infra..
30. While special advisory committees have investigative abilities, they are not an inherent
part of the judiciary, and their existence is more the exception than the rule. The courts'
function is, after all, judicial, not administrative. q: Haybum's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409
(1793) (refusing to involve the courts in administrative functions); Webster Eisenlohr, Inc. v.
Kalodner, 145 F.2d 316 (3d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 867 (1945) (striking down a lower
court order that a special master investigate the circumstances surrounding the dismissal of a
complaint, as investigation is not a judicial function).
31. See notes 46-47 infra and accompanying text.
32. See text following note 45 infra.
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There is no direct evidence of the framers' intent regarding which
branch should make rules of procedure for the courts-neither the
Federalist Papers nor the debates at the Constitutional Convention
addressed the issue. 33 Because the English courts of 1789, which
were the model for the American court system, had the power to
establish such rules, 34 it may be inferred that the framers intended
that American courts do so. 35 But this inference appears to conflict
with interpretations of several statutes enacted by the first Congress,36 in which sat many of the men who had written the Constitution.37
Despite this apparent conflict, however, a constitutionally
granted independent judicial power over rule-making is necessary if
the Court's past rule-making is to be reconciled with the rule against
advisory opinions. The rule against advisory opinions38 is based on
the separation-of-powers doctrine that the courts should exercise
only 'judicial" power, 39 a power the Supreme Court has defined as
the "application of principles of law and equity to [the] facts" of a
33. See Note, Separation of Powers and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 26 HASTINGS L.J.
1059, 1062-63 (1975).
34. See Pound, Regulation of Judicial Procedure by Rules of Court, 10 ILL, L. REV. 163,
170-73 (1915); Pound, supra note 26, at 601.
For a broad compilation of the English courts' actions in the rule-making area, see W.
TIDD, THE PRACTICE OF THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH (3d ed. 1803). These early decisions
barely considered the theoretical basis for such rule-making. Usually the courts were deciding
that they had power to make their own rules of evidence for cases in which foreign evidence
rules were the alternative. See, e.g., Clark v. Mullick, 13 Eng. Rep. 106 (P.C. 1840); Brown v.
Thornton, 112 Eng. Rep. 70 (K.B. 1837). On the other hand, in Rex v. Ellis, 108 Eng. Rep. 406
(K.B. 1826), the Court upheld judicial rule-making power against a direct challenge to it.
More common, however, were cases in which a court simply decided an evidence question
with no analysis of its power to do so. See, e.g., Wright v. Tatham, 7 Eng. Rep. 559 (H.L.
1838), and Rouch v. Great W.R.R., 113 Eng. Rep. 1049 (Q.B. 1841) (freely deciding hearsay questions); Wilson v. Rastall, 100 Eng. Rep. 1283 (K.B. 1792) (the attorney-client privilege
is the only one recognized by courts); the unnamed case from Y.B. Pasch 10 Jae., 123 Eng.
Rep. 656 (C.P. 1613) (a wife may not be compelled to testify against her husband).
35. As Dean Pound concluded in his analysis of English rule-making: "[l]f anything was
received from England as a part of our institutions, it was that the making of these general
rules of practice was a judicial function." Pound, supra note 26, at 601.
36. See notes 62-64 iefra and accompanying text.
37. Since many of the political leaders who drafted the Constitution sat in the first Congress, their actions should reflect their belief as to where the Constitution placed the rulemaking power. For a similar argument, see C. WARREN, CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION AND
THE SUPREME COURT 97-98 (2d ed. 1935).
38. The rule was first articulated in 1793, when the Supreme Court refused to answer questions posed by President Washington on the effect of the European war on American treaties
with European countries. Letter from Chief Justice John Jay to President George Washington
(Aug. 8, 1793), reprinted in J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 22, at 170 n.145. Since then, the Court
has consistently reaffirmed the rule. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1976); Aetna Life
Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. I (1936); Federal
Radio Commn. v. General Elec. Co., 281 U.S. 464 (1930); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S.
346 (1911); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137
(1803).
39. See Haybum's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1793).
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particular case.40 In short, the rule states that deciding a question
outside of an actual case or controversy is beyond the judicial
power.41 Since rule-making occurs by definition outside a case or
controversy, it fails to meet that test. One possible resolution of the
apparent conflict between judicial rule-making and that prohibition
is the theory that a congressional delegation of power to the Court
circumvents the rule. According to this argument, the rule-making
power is vested in the legislative branch but can be delegated to the
judiciary.42 But because the rule against advisory opinions is a constitutional one,43 Congress cannot circumvent it-since Rayburn's
Case 44 in 1793, the Court has consistently refused to allow Congress
to do so.45
40. Vermont v. New York, 417 U.S. 270, 277 (1974).
41. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239 (1937).
42. Judge Weinstein argues that the Supreme Court, in promulgating the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the Federal Rules of Evidence
pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, acted pursuant to power delegated by Congress. J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 22, at 89-96. Although he observes that early experiences with the Judiciary
Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, "underlined the courts' inherent procedural and rule powers"
and that the "contemporary attitude [was] that implied power to design court procedures
rested in the courts as well as Congress," id. at 57, he concludes that the rule-making power
has become Congress's to delegate as it pleases, id. at 89-90.
Judge Weinstein's purpose is to develop ideal rule-making procedures; because Judge
Weinstein is more concerned in his book with efficiency than constitutional propriety, the location of the rule-making power is less relevant for him than it must be for us. Consequently, his
analysis of this delegation question is brief and may simply reflect rather than justify the now
popular assumption that the rule-making power is ultimately legislative. See note 58 i,!fra and
accompanying text. To support his conclusion that Congress may delegate the power, Judge
Weinstein relies primarily upon Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (IO Wheat.) 1 (1825), and Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. I (1941), and secondarily upon Bank of United States v.
Halstead, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 151 (1825), and Beers v. Haughton, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 329 (1835).
J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 22, at 89-91.
However, this authority appears inappropriate. First, Judge Weinstein primarily emphasizes Chief Justice Marshall's language in Wayman, which, Judge Weinstein argues, acknowledges that the rule-making power is Congress's. Id. at 89. But Chief Justice Marshall's
language addressed congressional power vis-a-vis the states (federalism) and is therefore irrelevant to the Court/Congress (separation of powers) question. Chief Justice Marshall specifically denied the possibility of congressional delegation later in the opinion: "It will not be
contended that Congress can delegate to the Courts, or to any other tribunals, powers which
are strictly and exclusively legislative." 23 U.S. (IO Wheat.) at 42-43. Second, reliance upon
Sihhach suffers from similar difficulties, mention of which is best postponed until the discussion of Sihhach in text at notes 77-79 i,!fra. Third, Halstead actually reaches the opposite
conclusion-that the rule-making power is a judicial one. See text at note 68 i,!fra. Finally,
Beers simply restates the Wayman opinion, which, it has just been argued, does not support
exclusive congressional control.
· 43. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S, 227, 240 (1937).
44. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1793).
45. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I (1976); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346
(1911). Judge Weinstein acknowledges that the justiciability doctrine and the prohibition
against advisory opinions are barriers to judicial rule-making, J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 22, at
44-53, but he argues that these barriers may be surmounted since they lessen with the needs of
the situation. Although such an analysis may be sufficient for purposes of investigating possible reforms of the rule-making procedure, it is of little aid in describing the Constitution's
allocation of rule-making authority as that allocation has come to be construed. Judge Weinstein believes the advisory-opinion rule is ambiguous and cites some early examples in which
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The alternative and convincing resolution of the conflict is that
the power to establish rules of judicial procedure falls within the judicial power granted by article Ill, section 1. That power, it may be
argued, includes all powers necessary for a final adjudication of
cases, including the authority to establish the procedures necessary
for such adjudication. Under this theory, the Court receives the
power to promulgate rules directly from the Constitution-that
power is independent of enabling legislation and is unaffected by the
rule against advisory opinions.
If judicial rule-making power does fl.ow directly from article III,
the Court would be obligated to protect that constitutional power
from legislative infringement. That the Court has not done so, that it
has allowed Congress to control some aspects of judicial rule-making, suggests that the Court believes the Constitution must also have
created some legislative power over rule-making. This in turn suggests that rule-making is a shared power. How, then, should the
rule-making power be allocated? An analogy can be found in the
power over jurisdiction.
C.

The Analogy to the Power over Jurisdiction: The Primarily
Adjudicative Test

Congress defines the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts by
virtue of article Ill, section 1, and of article I, section 8, which authorize it to "ordain and establish" such courts. Under article Ill,
section 2, Congress may make "Exceptions" to and "Regulations"
for the appellate power of the Supreme Court. The Court has interpreted these clauses as giving Congress extensive control over jurisdiction. It has held that the lower courts' jurisdiction depends upon
affirmative congressional grants46 and that Congress may decide
which kinds of courts hear which cases.47 Congress's control over
the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is less certain. By controlling the
kinds of cases that may begin in the lower courts, Congress can affect
the kinds of cases that reach the Court. The Court may not by itself
enlarge the jurisdiction of the judiciary.48 A Reconstruction-period
case, Ex parte McCardle, held that Congress could directly limit the
the Court or individual Justices gave opinions outside the context of a specific case. Yet he
admits that such opinions might now be impossible given the development of the advisoryopinion rule. This Note, therefore, cannot simply dismiss the rule as ambiguous, but must try
to devise a coherent theory which reconciles the advisory-opinion rule with the judicial rulemaking that has occurred.
46. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 584 (1962) (plurality opinion); McIntire v.
Wood, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 503, 504 (1813).
47. Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943); Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236,245

(1845).
48. Montgomery Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Ledbetter Erection Co., 344 U.S. 178
(1952).
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Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction by preventing it from taking
appeals of habeas corpus proceedings from the lower federal
courts.49
However, there are limits to Congress's control of the Court's jurisdiction. For example, not only has McCardle been discredited,50
but United States v. Klein, 51 decided shortly after McCardle, held
that Congress's power could not be used to impose a rule of decision
on the Court. Congress may not place judicial power in bodies other
than the judiciary,52 it may not prevent the courts from making independent decisions,53 nor may the courts themselves assume nonjudicial power. 54
Underlying the holdings in all these cases is the proposition th;it
courts exclusively control all powers associated primarily with the
adjudication of cases. The test for determining when power over jurisdiction is to be reserved for the courts is whether that power is
necessary for an impartial adjudication. Under this test, broader social-policy judgments which are not necessary to the adjudication of
particular cases-such as whether the federal government should become involved in a given area-are left to Congress. But once Congress has, through legislation, indicated its decision that the federal
government should become involved, the adjudication of cases
under such legislation must be left to the judiciary.55
The primarily adjudicative test emerging from the jurisdiction
cases is a functional one-the allocation of power over a jurisdictional issue turns on whether that issue is associated with the pri49. 74 U.S. (I Wall.) 506, 514 (1868).
50. Both the plurality and dissent in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962), referred
to McCardle in dictum. Justice Harlan's plurality opinion concluded that at best Mccardle
must be narrowly read, 370 U.S. at 568, while Justice Douglas in dissent doubted that
McCardle could "command a majority view today," 370 U.S. at 605 n.11.
51. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871) (invalidating a congressional attempt to prevent the
Court from reviewing a legislative reversal of the Court's earlier interpretations of a presidential pardon).
52. See Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 578 (1933) (when a controversy requires
the exercise of the judicial power defined by article III, jurisdiction can only be conferred on
courts established by virtue of that article); Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement
Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856) (Congress can neither withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which is the subject of a suit nor can it bring under the judicial power a
matter which is not a subject for judicial determination).
53. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1871) (law declared unconstitutional because it attempted to prescribe for the judiciary the effect to be given to a presidential
pardon, thereby invading the province of the judiciary); Payne v. Griffin, 51 F. Supp. 588,591
(M.D. Ga. 1943) (while Congress can determine what cases a court may try, it cannot direct
what law shall control the decision).
54. See Vermont v. New York, 417 U.S. 270, 277 (1974) (refusing to approve a consent
decree calling for the appointment of a second Special Master because in supervising execution
of the decree the court would be more arbitral than judicial).
55. See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272
(1856).
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mary function of the judicial branch (adjudicating cases by applying
the law to their facts) or of the legislative branch (deciding what the
law will be). This Note submits that this test is equally applicable to
allocating ultimate control over the shared power to make rules. 56
The power over jurisdiction is the best source of guidance because it
is the only other area in which the two branches have had to work
out a system for harmonizing conflicting grants of power under article I and article III. Further, since Congress has occasionally attempted to control in detail the jurisdiction of the federal courts,
there is a rich and informative collection of decisional law in the
area.
As in the jurisdiction area, this test must be applied case by case.
Some kinds of rules, such as statutes of limitations, serve non-adjudicative functions; others, such as those establishing methods of pleading, may be purely adjudicative. If a rule contains elements of both,
its primary function must be ascertained. 57
' D. The Primarily Adjudicative Test and the Historical Exercise of
the Rule-Making Power
Because the courts have historically made rules pursuant to enabling legislation, while Congress has made them on its own authority, commentators and courts have often assumed that the rulemaking power is exclusively legislative. 58 Each step of that power's
history, however, reveals that, while Congress sometimes appears to
exercise exclusive rule-making power, the power has in fact been
shared between the two branches in accordance with the primarily
adjudicative test.
The first Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1789, which stated
that the "courts of the United States shall have power ... to make
and establish all necessary rules for the orderly conducting [of] business in the said courts." 59 If this statute delegated a power that ulti56. The power to define the federal courts' jurisdiction does have one significant difference
from the power over rule-making. Article III, § 2, of the Constitution explicitly grants power
over jurisdiction to Congress, but there is no similar grant regarding rule-making. However,
the effect of this difference, if any, should be to make legislative power weaker in the rulemaking area, which strengthens the conclusion reached in this part of the text. The important
similarity of shared legislative and judicial power remains.
57. The primary function of the privilege rules is analyzed in text at notes 87-91 iefra.
58. Such an assumption is vital to the holdings in casc:s such as United States v. Owens,
424 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) (congressional language of FED. R. EvJD. 501 controls
decisions of federal courts and thus overturns all specific privilege decisions in the proposed
rules), and the cases rejecting the Proposed Rules cited in note 150 iefra. Professor Thomas
Krattenmaker, too, apparently assumes there is absolute legislative supremacy over rule-making, since he consults primarily the legislative history of Federal Rule of Evidence 501 in
deciding what the federal privilege law is. Krattenmaker, Interpersonal Testimonial Privileges
Under the Federal Rules ofEvidence: A Suggested Approach, 64 GEO. L.J. 613 (1976). See also
note 42 supra.
59. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 17, I Stat. 73, 83.
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mately resides in Congress, then it would be a mandate for the courts
to exercise a nonjudicial power. Such a mandate would conflict with
the rule against advisory opinions. 60 It must, then, have been merely
a congressional acknowledgement or clarification of the Court's independent rule-making power. 61
Only five days after passing the Judiciary Act, Congress enacted
the Process Act of 1789, which ordered federal courts to- follow the
process procedures of the states in which they sat.62 Although Congress returned the power to establish process procedures to the federal courts in the Process Acts of 179263 and 1793,64 the three Process
Acts taken together suggest that Congress assumed that it had the
power to delegate at least some procedural rule-making authority.
Since the Supreme Court soon conceded that Congress had the
power to delegate rule-making authority, 65 both Congress and the
Court early recognized some congressional rule-making power. 66
However, the first Process Act merely subjugated the federal courts'
rule-making to the states' rule-making rather than to a federal statute. Thus, Congress's concern was federalism-in passing the Process Acts it made a policy decision between state and federal law.
The first Process Act was a decision that federal courts should not
establish process procedures; the second and third reversed that decision. Under the primarily adjudicative test, this is a substantive policy decision best made by Congress. The decision to place the power
to establish process procedures in the states rather than in the federal
courts, or vice versa, is distinguishable from a decision that this
power rests in Congress itself, and it was the former decision which
Congress made.
The Supreme Court's holdings on the Process Acts support the
theory developed in the preceding paragraph that the Acts only represented Congress's resolution of federalism· issues. In 1825, the
Court acknowledged Congress's power to make the federalism decision expressed in the Process Act of 1793.67 That same year, the
Court considered the argument that the Act's grant of rule-making
60. See text at notes 38-45 supra.
61. Other portions of the act contained just acknowledgements or clarifications. For example, § 9 granted the federal courts "exclusively of the courts of the several States, cognizance of
all crimes and offences that shall be cognizable under the authority of the United States."
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, I Stat. 73 (footnote omitted). Such power clearly was granted
the federal courts by article III. See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59
U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
62. Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, I Stat. 93.
63. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, I Stat. 275.
64. Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 7, I Stat. 333. ·
65. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (JO Wheat.) I (1825). But see note 42 supra.
66. Even the most avid proponents of judicial rule-making concede the existence of some
legislative rule-making power. See note 26 supra.
67. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (JO Wheat.) I (1825).
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power to the federal courts unconstitutionally delegated legislative
power. The Court stated that that power was judicial, subject to a
legislative check: "Congress might regulate the whole practice of the
courts, if it was deemed expedient so to do: but this power is vested
in the courts; and it never has occurred to any one, that it was a
delegation of legislative power."68
Nor did the Court's behavior through the rest of the nineteenth
century fail to accord with the "primarily adjudicative" test. In that
century, the Court established rules of procedure69 but yielded to
Congress on the federalism decision embodied in the Conformity
Act of 1872.70
The modem era of rule-making began in 1934, when Congress
replaced the Conformity Act with the Rules Enabling Act. 71 That
Act provides that the Supreme Court "shall have the power" to
make rules of procedure for the federal courts in civil cases but that
"[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right." 72 Rules do not take effect until ninety days after they are
reported to Congress.73 Generally, the Rules Enabling Act follows
the pattern of the Process Acts: Congress made the federalism decision that rules· shall be made by the national government.
However, the last two paragraphs of the Act, which ban substantive changes and prevent proposed rules from going into effect until
Congress has the opportunity to review them, have been taken to
suggest that Congress has delegated merely the power to propose
rules. Acording to this interpretation, congressional approval, even
if only tacit, is required to establish rules. 74 Proponents of this position rely not only on the language of the Act, but on language in
68. Bank of United States v. Halstead, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 51, 61 (1825). The part of the
quoted sentence before the colon is ambiguous and might be read to suggest that rule-making
power is exclusively congressional. Such a reading is not required, however. First, in ll(J/slead
and its companion case, Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) I (1825), the Court was
speaking in the context of a conflict between state and federal court practices. Thus, the Court
was confirming that Congress might require that federal court procedures conform to state
procedures. See text following note 78 infra. Second, if the ambiguous portion is not to contradict the clear purport of the second half of the sentence, it must be taken to be speaking of a
practical capacity of Congress to regulate the courts and a constilulional decision that such
regµlation would not be "expedient."
69. A brief but thorough history of these practices can be found in J. WEINSTEIN, supra
note 22, at 60-64.
70. Conformity Act of 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 197. The Act required that federal court
procedures conform with state procedures. Rules of evidence were specifically exempted from
this requirement and were to be determined by federal law. Under the theory developed by
this Note, this should be suffiqient to empower the courts to make evidence decisions, as they
later did (see cases cited in note 80 infra).
71. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, §§ I, 2, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(1976)).
72. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976) (the full text of this section is reproduced in note 7 supra),
73. 28 u.s.c. § 2072 (1976).
74. See cases cited in note 150 infra.
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cases in which the Supreme Court has considered challenges to the
Federal Rules ·of Civil Procedµre. The two most prominent examples are Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. 75 and Hanna v. Pfumer.7 6 In
Sibbach, for instance, the Court said, "Congress has undoubted
power to regulate the practice and procedure of federal courts, and
may exercise that power by delegating to this or other federal courts
authority to make rules not inconsistent with the statutes or constitution of the United States."77
There are three problems with citing such language in order to
prove that Congress has exclusive rule-making power. First, the Enabling Act's language is more consistent with the primarily adjudicative theory. Both the provision requiring reporting to Congress and
the ban against substantive changes are mechanisms which permit
Congress to inspect rules that require substantive policy decisions.
Moreover, that the clause establishes a review period but requires no
congressional action to give the rules authority suggests that it was
simply intended to allow Congress to exercise its check against
changes in substantive policy.
Second, the challenges to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
Sibbach and Hanna concerned the validity of the Rules vis-a-vis
contrary state practices.78 Since such federalism questions involve
policy choices that rest with Congress, the Court focussed on congressional power over rule-making. In other words, those cases discussed federalism questions rather than questions concerning
separation of powers, and the frequently cited passages in them are,
as to the separation-of-powers issue, dicta and no more.
Third, if the Rules Enabling Act simply empowers the courts to
make proposals, it conflicts with the rule against advisory opinions.
In considering a regulatory scheme that called for review by the
Court subject to final action by the President, the Court concluded
that rendering a judicial decision "which has only the force of a recommendation . . . would be to render an advisory opinion in its
most obnoxious form." 79 In sum, the better interpretation of the
Rules Enabling Act is that it allows Congress to review any substantive issues implicated by a procedural rule, but that it also does not
infringe on the judiciary's power to make by itself any primarily adjudicative rules.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

312 U.S. 1 (1941).
380 U.S. 460 (1965).
312 U.S. at 9-10.
See 312 U.S. at 7; 380 U.S. at 462.
Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948).
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RULES OF EVIDENCE

The history of the rule-making power, we have seen, reveals that
it is shared between the legislature and the judiciary. This Note next
examines the most recent example of that sharing-the Proposed
Rules of Evidence-in order to discover what authority the Proposed
Rules on privileges have.
A. Historical Practice
Both the legislature and the judiciary have made rules of evidence for well over one-hundred years. 80 Initially, Congress was reluctant to do so;81 when it began to write rules of evidence, it did so
only in specific instances rather than by promulgating general
rules.82 The Court, on the other hand, has freely decided questions
of evidence in individual cases without legislative authorization. 83
By the beginning of this century the decisions in Funk v. United
States 84 and United States v. Wo!fle 85 had established that the judicial branch could decide questions of evidence, including those concerning privileges, as a matter of federal common law.
Whether the Court should promulgate rules of evidence through
a rule-making procedure, rather than case by case, is, of course, another question,86 and rules on privileges present unique considerations. While other rules of evidence are primarily aimed at reaching
the truth in a trial by ensuring that evidence is reliable, 87 privilege
rules serve policy considerations external to the actual trial process. 88
80. Specific congressional evidence rules were upheld in Ex parle Fisk, 113 U.S. 713
(1885), and Ogden v. Saunders, 26 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 212 (1827).
The Court adopted rules of evidence case by case in Wolfie v. United States, 291 U.S. 7
(1934); Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933); United States v. Murphy, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.)
203 (1842); and United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 460 (1827). However, not until
Wo!fle and Funk did the Court explicitly announce its authority to establish rules of evidence.
81. See, e.g., Conformity Act of 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 197 (discussed in note 70 supra)
exempting evidence rules from the conformity requirement.
82. See, e.g., Act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25 (setting burden of proof standards for
certain federal criminal cases).
83. See cases cited in the second paragraph of note 80 supra.
84. 290 U.S. 371 (1933).
85. 291 U.S. 7 (1934).
86. Judge Weinstein suggests that rule-making ought not replace common-law decisions
since, unlike rule-making decisions, common-law decisions are the result of "aci;retion," the
slow movement which allows the Court to learn from the mistakes and experience of all the
federal courts. J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 22, at 14-15. Yet whenever the Supreme Court
makes a ruling over a specific case, the "accretion" may then end. Even if it does not, the
superiority of "accretion" over rules is not at all apparent. First, the rule-makers have all past
cases available for consideration. Second, rule-making benefits from many different points of
view since rules are drafted by an advisory committee which consists of and consults with
people of varied experience and outlook.
87. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 2175 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
88. Id at § 2285.
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That difference might suggest that only Congress can write privilege
rules.89 However, the decision to grant a privilege is not simply a
decision to protect certain relationships by preserving the confidentiality of information communicated within them. Rather, it involves
a balancing of the value of that goal-a value external to the trial
process-with the value of ensuring that courts hear the most reliable available evidence-a value internal to the trial process. 90 Although it is within Congress's purview to determine which
relationships deserve protection, it is within the courts' to determine
whether they will decide cases without admitting evidence that may
be highly relevant. 91 Thus, neither branch should have exclusive
power to write rules governing privileges. According to the primarily adjudicative test, .then, the authority of the Proposed Rules on
privileges turns on whether Congress in its reaction to them was
making substantive policy judgments and thereby commanding judicial obedience. The legislative history of rule 501 indicates that it
was not.

B. The Legislative History of Rule 501
Federal Rule of Evidence 501, as we have seen, instructs the
courts to decide questions of privilege by using "the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted . . . in the light of reason
and experience." That language was taken from former Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 2692 at the suggestion of Judge
Friendly.93 Congressional explanations that the rule was intended to
leave the law on privileges in "its current condition" 94 or "present
state," 95 to be developed by the courts on a "case-by-case basis," 96
hardly clarify Congress's reasons for rejecting the rules proposed by
the Supreme Court. Crucially, the events leading up to the adoption
of rule 501 and the generality of its language indicate that, in rejecting the Supreme Court's specific Proposed Rules on privileges,
Congress was motivated by time pressures and political imperatives
rather than by a desire to protect its policy judgments.
In establishing nine and only nine specific privileges97 the Pro89. See, e.g., Krattenmaker, supra note 58; Note, supra note 33, at 1070-75.
90. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690 (1972).
91. If the evidence were not relevant, the privilege holder would be able to exclude it for
precisely that reason. See FED. R. Evm. 402 & 403.
92. 327 U.S. 821, 852 (1946). See Krattenmaker, supra note 58, at 643-45.
93. Hearings on Proposed Rules if Evidence Btjore the Special Subcomm. on Reform if
Federal Criminal Laws efthe House Comm on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 247 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
94. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d. Sess. 6 (1974) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
95. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1973) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT].
96. SENATE REPORT, supra note 94, at 13.
97. See notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
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posed Rules determined which confidential relationships would be
protected and which would not. Because this determination involved complex and politically difficult questions, the ninety-day period that the Rules Enabling Act provided before the Proposed
Rules would take effect was too short to permit a full discussion of
those questions. Thus, Congress's response to the Proposed Rules
began with Senate Resolution S. 583, 98 which extended that time period to the end of the session. 99 Subsequently, both houses voted for
an indefinite postponement of the date on which the Proposed Rules
would become effective. 100
Having decided to postpone that date, Congress next faced a federalism issue: even if the Supreme Court's rules were to be adopted
in cases heard in the federal courts under federal-question jurisdiction, should they be adopted in cases heard under diversity jurisdiction? In the latter situation, adopting the Proposed Rules would
subordinate state law on privilege to federal law. Deciding that the
states' interest in the policies underlying privileges outweighed the
federal interest in uniform rules, Congress incorporated state law for
diversity cases. 101 The final reports of both houses emphasized their
concern with the federalism issue. In the House Report, Representative Hungate said that this concern was the primary reason for Congress's intervention in the privilege sections of the Proposed Rules. 102
The Senate's explanation of its rejection of the Proposed Rules on
privilege stressed even more forcefully that concern. 103 Thus, in rejecting the Supreme Court's proposals for diversity cases, Congress
was deciding that the federal government should not become involved in a certain area. 104 Under the primarily adjudicative test
this is a decision which can properly be made by Congress and
which must be respected by the courts.
Still, this does not explain Congress's rejection of the Proposed
Rules in federal-question cases. Indeed, the Conference Committee
Report specifically concluded that, because of important federal concerns, 105 federal law on privileges should apply in such cases. Three
98. It was presented by Sen. Ervin on Jan. 29, 1973, 119 CONG. REC. 2395, and passed by
the Senate on Feb. 7, 1973, 119 CONG. REC. 3755.
99. Comments by both House Subcommittee members and witnesses at House hearings
show that shortness of the time period for considering the Proposed Rules was one of the most
important reasons for delaying their effective date. See Hearings on Federal Rules ofEvidence
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974) (hereinafter cited as
Senate Hearings] (comments of Rep. Hungate); House Hearings, supra note 93, at 104-05 (testimony of several New York Bar Association members).
100. Act of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9.
101. Proposed Rules SOI, 56 F.R.D. at 230, reprinted in text at note 17 supra.
102. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 95, at 7-8.
103. SENATE REPORT, supra note 94, at 607.
104. For a discussion of power over jurisdiction, see text at note 55 supra.
105. H.R. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7, 8 (1974). Although Congress recognized
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explanations of that rejection are possible. First, Congress might
have been making a substantive policy decision to reject the judgments embodied in the Proposed Rules. Second, Congress might
have been objecting to codification but not to the substance of the
rules. Third, given the delay over the federalism issue and given the
even greater delay consideration of the interests of politically diverse
groups would have caused, Congress might have succumbed to the
pressures of time and to the complexity of the political situation it
faced.
The legislative history shows that the first explanation-that
Congress deliberately rejected the Court's decisions-is inaccurate.
Indeed, Congress consciously avoided such a judgment. The Senate
Report cautioned, in regard to rule 501:
It should be clearly understood that, in approving this general rule as
to privileges, the action of Congress should not be understood as disapproving any recognition of a psychiatrist-patient, or husband-wife, or
any other of the enumerated privileges contained in the Supreme
Court rules. Rather, our action should be understood as reflecting the
view that the recognition of a privilege based on a confidential relationship and other privileges should be determined on a case-by-case
basis. 106

This language, and the provision requiring express congressional
approval of any amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 107
might seem to support the second explanation-that Congress objected to codification 108-as might Congress's unwillingness to substitute its own specific rules for the Court's. This explanation,
however, also fails. Although there were members of Congi:ess 109
and witnesses 110 at the congressional hearings who opposed codifithat the states' privilege laws represented substantive decisions, it was also concerned about the
effect state privilege laws could have on federal policies. Giving a state's decision priority over
a federal privilege decision would subjugate the national judiciary to the decisions of the state
governments in a way which could jeopardize other federal policies. For example, a state's
employer-employee privilege regarding wages could impede federal revenue collection enforcement.
On the other hand, Congress was also sensitive to the need for uniformity in privilege law.
Id. A split between federal question and diversity cases was thought the best compromise,
since it would keep the privilege laws applicable to a given cause of action uniform across the
different forums while still protecting federal policies from state encroachment.
106. SENATE REPORT, supra note 94, at 13.
107. 28 U.S.C. § 2076 (1976). See text at note 18 supra.
108. This is Professor Krattenmaker's thesis, supra note 58, at 640-46. It takes the comments of a few individuals (including witnesses who were not even members of Congress) as
the voice of the whole Congress. See note 110 i'!fra and accompanying text.
109. E.g., Rep. Holtzman, 120 CONG. REc. 1415 (1974); Rep. Podell, House Hearings,
supra note 93, at 5-7.
110. E.g., Alvin Hellerstein, Francis Koch, and Joseph McLaughlin (representing the New
York Bar Association), House Hearings, supra note 93, at 114-15; Charles Halpern and George
Frampton (representing the Washington Council of Lawyers), id. at 160-63; E. Barrett Prettyman (by letter, representing the District of Columbia Bar), id. at 244-45; Judge Friendly, id. at
246.
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cation of the privilege rules, they were part of that minority which
also rejected codification of any rules of evidence: 111 there is no evidence that their views on codification represented the majority opinion in Congress. 112 On the contrary, the support in committee
discussions and in the floor debate for a uniform set of rules of evidence was overwhelming. 11 3
In light of this support for uniform rules of evidence, the theory
that uniformity was viewed as undesirable in the privilege area is
plausible only if some factor distinguished rules on privilege from
other rules of evidence. Rules on privilege do present unique considerations, because they embody judgments on policy concerns related to matters external to the judicial process. 114 However,
uniformity is crucial in carrying out the substantive policies embodied in privileges; non-uniform results weaken such policies. Privileges encourage confidential communication between parties in
certain relationshipsm by guaranteeing that the privileged party can
prevent the other party from disclosing the communication as evidence against him. The degree of encouragement will vary directly
with the reliability of the guarantee. If communications are protected in one jurisdiction, not protected in another, and in doubt in
still another, there can be no certainty that the privilege will be protected in the circuit where a suit may arise, and the most prudent
action will be to refrain from all such communications. Thus, nonuniformity may make the most protective version of a rule only as
strong as the least protective. 116 In short, uniformity of rules of privilege is no less desirable than uniformity of other rules of evidence.
11 l. See sources cited in notes 109-IO supra. Judge Friendly's testimony is illustrative:
"While I do disagree with many details of the proposed rules, my basic position is that it is
now undesirable to have a Federal Code of Evidence in any form." House Hearings, supra
note 93, at 246.
112. For example, Rep. Holtzman dissented to the House Report. House REPORT, supra
note 95, at 27-29.
113. For example, the House Report began with the statement: "The purpose of this legislation is to provide a uniform code of evidence for use in the Federal courts." House REPORT,
supra note 95, at l. See also SENATE REPORT, supra note 94, at 8; 120 CONG, Rec. 40076
(1974) (remarks of Sen. Hruska); 120 CONG. REc. 37084 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Taft); House
REPORT, supra note 95, at 4 (remarks of Rep. Hungate); 120 CONG. Rec. 1416-17 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Mayne); 120 CONG. REC. 1411-12 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Rodino); 120 CONG,
REc. 1413 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Smith); 120 CONG. REC. 40891-92 (1974) (remarks of Rep.
Zion).
114. See text at notes 87-91 supra. Indeed, it may be for this reason that Congress decided
to leave decisions concerning privilege to state law in diversity cases.
115. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 87, at § 2285.
116. It might be argued that Congress was responding to those special interest groups demanding privilege protection for their professions by leaving the door open for the courts to
create new privileges. See notes 122-24 i,!fra and accompanying text. However, since a privilege must be uniformly accepted to provide any true benefit to a profession, the disuniformity
resulting from Congress's action leaves such a possibility too speculative to be confidently
accepted.
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Although by virtue of section 583, Congress had unlimited time
to review the Proposed Rules, 117 Representative Hungate 118 and
Senator Hruska, 119 as they introduced those rules to their respective
houses, expressed the fear that postponing the decision to enact the
Federal Rules of Evidence until the next session might sidetrack that
decision indefinitely. Thus, there was a sense of urgency about acting before adjournment. As the House vote to foreclose debate on
the rules on privilege to avoid indefinite delay demonstrates, 120 it
was the controversy over those rules that threatened to block adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
While Congress was able to avoid much debate over many of the
other rules either by adopting the Court's proposals verbatim or by
making only minor technical changes, 121 in deciding to reject the
proposals on privilege in diversity cases to accommodate the concern
over federalism, Congress had assumed direct control over, and thus
responsibility for, the substance of those rules. Congress quickly
found itself besieged by interest groups seeking other substantive
changes. Although most of the rules were important and divided the
legal community, 122 each decision whether to include a particular
privilege directly affected other politically powerful special-interest
groups as well. 123 Representative Hungate summarized the problem:
"People did not like the changes being made; when you open this up,
the social workers and the piano tuners want a privilege. It is a very
difficult matter, so we left that where it is for now." 124
Congress sought a compromise which, because it neither included nor excluded any particular profession, would be acceptable
to all and would prevent an indefinite delay in passing the entire set
of rules. Those who drafted rule 501 emphasized that it was only a
stopgap, not the ultimate solution to the problem. 125 Thus, the only
policy judgment that can be said to have motivated the adoption of
rule 501 was the desire to delay a policy judgment; there is no evidence that the rule was designed to serve any other extra-judicial
policy.
117. See notes 98-100 supra and accompanying text.
I 18. 120 CONG. REC. 40890 (1974).
119. 120 CONG. REC. 40069 (1974).
120. 120 CONG. REC. 1410 (1974).
121. For a list su=arizing the congressional changes, see P. ROTHSTEIN (Supp. 1974),
supra note 4, at 57-65.
122. For examples of division of legal opinion, see the co=ents of various members of
the bar throughout House Hearings, supra note 93, and Rep. Holtzman's dissent to the House
Report, 120 CONG. REC. 1415 (1974).
123. For a list of these special interest groups, see Krattenmaker, supra note 58, at 641
n.196, 642 nn. 203-10.
124. Senate Hearings, supra note 99, at 6.
125. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REC. 40069 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Hruska); 120 CONG. REC.
40890 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Hungate).
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THE STANDARD OF DEFERENCE GIVEN JUDICIALLY
PROMULGATED RULES

The Supreme Court has yet to decide what authority, if any,
should be given the Proposed Rules. 126 If Congress's decision to reject the Proposed Rules on privileges had been primarily based on
policy concerns that outweighed the courts' interest in control over
their own adjudicative procedures, then, under the primarily adjudicative test, the Proposed Rules would not affect the courts' resolutions of privilege issues in federal-question cases. 127 However, if, as
this Note has argued, that decision was reached merely to avoid
making policy judgments and to return the responsibility for making
such judgments to the courts, then the Proposed Rules should be
afforded the same weight as a set of rules which Congress had simply
allowed to go into effect.
A. By the Supreme Court
Because the Supreme Court promulgated these rules, it is not
precluded from reconsidering whether to follow them. The Court
can overrule its own prior holdings, and since judicial rules are not
written in the context of a particular case, they lack even the author126. The Court had the opportunity to consider the Proposed Rules in Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), where, in the context of a claim that the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination had been violated, the attorney-client privilege became relevant.
Citing a series of lower court decisions and the consensus of the treatises, the Court gave
passing attention to the attorney-client privilege, remarking that it existed in the federal courts.
425 U.S. at 402-03. The attorney-client privilege was an uncontroversial privilege embodied in
Proposed Rule 503. 56 F.R.D. at 235-40. On one hand, since the Court did not cite the Proposed Rules as authority, one might infer that they are to be disregarded. On the other hand,
since the attorney-client privilege was uncontroversial, and since Proposed Rule 503 simply
codified existing law, there was no need to determine the authority of the Proposed Rules, In
fact, the common law of attorney-client privilege is so clearly developed that reference to the
Rules was unnecessary. For example, in Fisher, the Court quoted FED. R. Evm. 501, but
continued, "Thus, whether or not Rule 501 applies to this case, the attorney-client privilege
issue is governed by the principles and authorities" of the case law and the consensus of the
treatises. 425 U.S. at 402 n.8.
127. It should be noted that this position conflicts with that taken by the congressional
amendments to the Rules Enabling Act. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, § 2(2)(1), 88
Stat. 1948 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2076 (1976)) (quoted in text at note 18 supra). As argued in
the preceding Part, such a limitation is beyond the reach of congressional power over rulemaking.
As noted in that Part, article Ill's grant of judicial power provides the judiciary with the
power to make rules that do not conflict with substantive policy decisions made by Congress.
Congress cannot, by legislation, remove that power from the courts. Yet the broad sweep of
these amendments attempts to do just that.
The restriction that the amendment purports to impose is particularly repugnant under
constitutional analysis because it is aimed only at controlling the procedure by which the
Court makes privilege decisions. It leaves the Court the power to make such decisions case by
case, but orders the Court to use a rule-making procedure to make those decisions. Such a
system fails to preserve substantive issues for the Congress, while at the same time it infringes
on the judiciary's power to regulate its own procedures.

Proposed Rules of Evidence

June 1978]

1197

ity of stare decisis. 128 Considering this issue as it pertained to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court concluded in Mississippi
Publishing Corp. v. Murphree: "The fact that this Court promulgated
the rules as formulated and recommended by the Advisory Committee does not foreclose consideration of their validity, meaning, or
consistency." 129 In Murphree, however, the Court upheld the challenged rule; 130 indeed, it has never invalidated such a rule. 131
The Proposed Rules on privileges differ, of course, from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in that Congress has not approved
them. Thus, the Court might be more willing to question one of the
Proposed Rules if it were challenged. However, the Court has already considered the policy decisions embodied in the Proposed
Rules, 132 and a congressional stalemate is insufficient reason for the
Court to re-evaluate those decisions.
B.

By the Lower Federal Courts

The lower courts have, of course, consistently held themselves
bound by judicially promulgated rules which have been implicitly
approved by Congress. 133 Presented with the unprecedented situation that the Proposed Rules of Evidence were not approved by Congress; that some courts had already relied on portions of the
Proposed Rules in the interim between their promulgation by the
Court and their rejection by Congress; 134 and that there has been no
128. J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 22, at 914-15.
129. 326 U.S. 438,444 (1946). Justices Black and Douglas denied this proposition in memoranda dissenting from various Court-made amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 398 U.S. 979 (1970); 383 U.S. 1089 (1966); 374 U.S. 865 (1963); 368 U.S. 1012 (1961).
They contended that the Court would feel bound in some degree by such rules to avoid "the
embarrassment of having to sit in judgment of the constitutionality of rules which [the Court
has] approved and which as applied in given situations might have to be declared invalid."
374 U.S. at 870.
130. 326 U.S. at 445-46.
131. There are two possible reasons why the Court has consistently followed its own rules.
First, before the Court promulgates such rules, it is presumably satisfied that the rules are
those it supports. Second, Congress has hitherto always implicitly approved the rules, see text
at note 20 supra, and such legislative concurrence has given the rules added authority. Both
reasons are given in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965) (footnote omitted):
[T]he court has been instructed to apply the Fedr.ral Rule [of Civil Procedure], and can
refuse to do so only if the Advisory Committee, this Court, and Congress erred in their
prima facie judgment that the Rule in question transgresses neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions.
132. The Court demanded several drafts of the Proposed Rules of Evidence before finally
promulgating them. See text at notes 2-6 supra.
133. Couch v. United States, 235 F.2d 519, 521 (D.C. Cir. 1956); John R. Alley & Co. v.
Federal Natl. Bank, 124 F.2d 995, 998 (10th Cir. 1942); Beasley v. United States, 81 F. Supp.
518, 527 (E.D.S.C. 1948); C.J. Weiland & Son Dairy Prods. Co. v. Wickard, 4 F.R.D. 250, 252
(E.D. Wis. 1945); Westland Oil Co. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 3 F.R.D. 55, 56 (D.N.D.
1943); Kuenzel v. Universal Carloading & Distrib. Co., 29 F. Supp. 407,409 (E.D. Pa. 1939);
American Graphophone Co. v. National Phonograph Co., 127 F. 349, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1904).
134. See, e.g., United States v. Van Dronen, 501 F.2d 1393 (7th Cir. 1974) (Proposed Rule
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guidance from the Supreme Court, the lower courts have responded
in ways that span virtually the entire spectrum of possible solutions.
At one end of the spectrum are courts that have given great
weighf to the Proposed Rules. As Judge Weinstein explained in
United States v. Mackey:
Despite their deletion by Congress, the privilege rules promulgated by
the Supreme Court remain of considerable utility as standards. . . .
The specific Rules on privilege promulgated by the Supreme Court
are reflective of "reason and experience." They are the culmination of
three drafts prepared by an Advisory Committee consisting of judges,
practicing lawyers and academicians. In its many years of work, the
Committee considered hundreds of suggestions received in response to
the circulation of the drafts throughout the legal community. Finally;
they were adopted by the Supreme Court by an eight to one vote. The
rule against advisory opinions is only slightly more violated by giving
weight to this vote than it would have been had Congress not vetoed
these provisions, and had they become "Rules," rather than "standards."135

At the other extreme was the court in United States v. Owens,
which rejected the Proposed Rules and the precedents based thereon
because "the Congress abandon[ed]" them. 136 Courts in between
have viewed the Proposed Rules as "the best of current thinking in
the common law 'in the light of reason and experience' " 137 but, apparently, as having no authority of their own; as confirmation of the
Supreme Court's view that the privileges omitted by the Proposed
Rules are not constitutionally mandated; 138 as "useful standard[s]
from which analysis can proceed"; 139 as "some evidence of 'the principles of the common law' . . . [but not] authoritative"; 140 or simply
as weight to add to other authority. 141 In short, the courts can agree
on neither the legal authority nor the persuasiveness of the Proposed
Rules.
Where the Proposed Rules merely codified a well-established
federal common-law privilege, of course, courts have consistently retained it. For example, federal courts had always refused to recog505); In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1973) (Proposed Rule 503); United States v. Luther,
481 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1973) (Proposed Rule 506); Eutectic Corp. v. Meleo, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 35
(E.D.N.Y. 1973) (Proposed Rule 503).
135. 405 F. Supp. 854, 857-58 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). See 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEIN•
STEIN'S EVIDENCE 501-20.4 to 20.5 (3d ed. 1977). The relationship of judicial rule-making to
the constitutional ban against advisory opinions is discussed in text at notes 38-45 supra.
136. 424 F. Supp. 421, 422-23 (E.D. Tenn. 1976).
137. Eutectic Corp. v. Meleo, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 35, 38 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
138. United States ex rel Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1045-46 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
139. United States v. King, 73 F.R.D. 103, 105 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
140. SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508, 522 (D. Conn. 1976).
141. See United States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1975).
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nize a physician-patient privilege. 142 It was omitted from the
Proposed Rules, 143 and the federal cases decided since the promulgation of the Proposed Rules have also refused to_recognize that privilege.144
The Proposed Rules, however, did not always merely codify established common-law privileges, and, naturally, it is where they did
not that the problem arises. The greatest potential benefit of the Proposed Rules is that they provided uniform privilege decisions for all
the federal courts. Such uniformity is, we have seen, critical to privilege law. 145 But confusion over the authority of the Proposed Rules
threatens to strip them of that advantage. For this policy reason, and
because the primarily adjudicative test establishes that the authority
of the Court's rules on privilege in federal-question cases has been
left intract by Congress, the lower courts' confusion is needless and
mistaken.
The Proposed Rules, for instance, departed from established federal common law by not recognizing the marital confidential-communication privilege. 146 In 1951, the Supreme Court had recognized
that privilege as applicable in the federal courts. 147 The Advisory
Committee, however, chose to adopt only the anti-marital facts privilege in the Proposed Rules. 148 The lower courts that have faced the
issue since the promulgation of the Proposed Rules appear to continue to recognize the confidential-communication privilege. 149
However, the Advisory Committee and Supreme Court decisions to
eliminate this privilege may mean that such uniformity will be shortlived. If the courts begin to disagree over this privilege, it will resem142. See United States v. Harper, 450 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1971) (refusing to recognize the
privilege because it has traditionally been rejected by the federal courts).
143. See Proposed Rule 504 and accompanying Advisory Committee note, 56 F.R.D. at
241-44.
144. See, e.g., In re Verplank, 329 F. Supp. 433 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
Similarly, the Proposed Rules incorporated the so-called "informer's privilege," which is
part of the federal common law. See Proposed Rule 510 and accompanying Advisory Committee note, 56 F.R.D. at 255. Post-promulgation decisions have consistently recognized the
privilege. United States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Rawlinson, 487 F.2d 5 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Hurse, 453 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1971); PortaKamp Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 953 (8th Cir. 1971); United States v. Real Estate Bd., 59
F.R.D. 637 (E.D. Mo. 1973); United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
145. See text at note I 16 supra.
146. There are two distinct marital privileges: the anti-marital facts privilege and the confidential-communication privilege. The former allows the privilege holder to prevent liis or her
spouse from testifying against the privilege holder. The latter protects any communication
made in confidence between the two spouses and therefore survives a dissolution of the marriage. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 87, at §§ 2333, 2335.
147. Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332 (1951).
148. See Proposed Rule 505 and accompanying Advisory Committee note, 56 F.R.D. at
244. This Proposed Rule also limited the anti-marital facts privilege to criminal cases.
149. See, e.g., United States v. Bolzer, 556 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Smith,
533 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1976).
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ble the areas where the Proposed Rules attempted to resolve questions left unresolved by the federal common law. There are several
such areas, 150 but an analysis of one-the anti-marital facts privilege-illustrates the different applications of the Proposed Rules and
the resultant disuniformity.
In 1958, the Supreme Court held the anti-marital facts privilege
applicable in the federal courts. 151 Although the Court held that the
exceptions to this privilege should be limited, it did not indicate
which exceptions should be recognized. 152 The Proposed Rules,
however, did list such exceptions, 153 and since the promulgation of
the Proposed Rules, three courts have relied on that list to decide
which exceptions to recognize. 154 However, one court has held that
rule 501 adopts only the well-recognized common-law exceptions. 155
Thus, the law on the anti-marital facts privilege is completely unresolved. It is to prevent such lack of uniformity, and the resulting
weakening of federal privileges, that this Note recommends that the
lower courts consider themselves bound by the Proposed Rules on
privileges.
,

CONCLUSION

The legislative history of rule 501 indicates that that rule was
adopted in response to time pressures rather than to implement pol150. Privilege questions left unresolved by the federal common law include: (I) the staterequired-reports privilege, adopted in Proposed Rule 502, 56 F.R.D. at 234 (see In re Grand
Jury Impaneled Jan. 21, 1975, 541 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1976), hut see United States v. King, 73
F.R.D. 103 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (disapproving the across-the-board adoption of this privilege in
the Proposed Rules, but then deciding that even under the Proposed Rules, this privilege
would not have applied to the particular facts of the instant case)); (2) the extension of the
attorney-client privilege to include communication to those assisting the attorney, adopted in
Proposed Rule 503(a)(3), 56 F.R.D. at 236 (see United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036 (3d
Cir. 1975); In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1973) (dictum); United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d
142 (8th Cir. 1972) (relying on the Proposed Rules to make such extensions), hul see United
States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146, 151-53 (9th Cir. 1974) (dictum) (rejecting both such an extension and the authority of the Proposed Rules)); (3) the extension of the attorney-client privilege
to intra-corporate co=unications made for the purpose of obtaining legal services, adopted
in Proposed Rule 503(b), 56 F.R.D. at 236 (see Eutectic Corp. v. Meleo, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 35
(E.D.N.Y. 1973) (accepting the privilege), hut see SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508
(D. Conn. 1976) (rejecting the privilege)); (4) the psychotherapist-patient privilege, adopted in
Proposed Rule 504, 56 F.R.D. at 240 (see Lora v. Board of Educ., 74 F.R.D. 565, 574-76
(E.D.N.Y. 1977) (dictum); United States ex rel Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1043-44
(E.D.N.Y. 1976) (dictum) (adopting the privilege), hut see United States v. Meagher, 531 F.2d
752, 753 (5th Cir. 1976) (rejecting the privilege)).
151. Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
152. Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 79 (1958).
153. Proposed Rule 505(c), 56 F.R.D. at 244-45.
154. United States v. Cameron, 556 F.2d 752, 755-56 (5th Cir. 1977) (relying upon inference from Advisory Committee note); United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362 (8th Cir. 1975)
(Proposed Rule 505(c)(I)); United States v. Van Dronen, 501 F.2d 1393, 1397 (7th Cir. 1974)
(Proposed Rule 505(c)(2)).
155. United States v. Owens, 424 F. Supp. 421, 423 (E.D. Tenn. 1976).
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icy considerations external to the adjudicative process. Under the
primarily adjudicative test, such a motive cannot justify vesting this
congressional action with the power and effect of a legislative veto
of the Proposed Rules.
The practice of the federal courts has been to treat judicially
promulgated rules of procedure as binding. Because Congress has,
in rule 501, shifted the responsibility for making decisions on privilege to the courts, and because the Proposed Rules receive their authority from the same source-the Supreme Court-as the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, they should also be recognized as binding
by the lower courts. Such recognition will result in uniformity that
will enhance the effectiveness of privileges and will provide the
courts with an efficient way of deciding questions of privilege.

